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ABSTRACT 
This project intends to analyze the shift in party systems which took place the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) in the late eighties and the nineties. The Republic of China has been once established in 
the mainland China and later had to move the government onto Taiwan, island of Formosa, as the 
communist took over power and established the People’s Republic of China also claiming rights 
over Taiwan in 1949, a conflict that remains into the present day.  Before 1986 the republic of 
China was an authoritarian single-party regime under martial law, controlled by the Kuomintang. 
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, the Republic of China was gradually democratized. 
Opposition parties were legalized, freedom of speech was established, and competitive elections 
took place at all levels of government. Throughout the nineties, the Kuomintang retained control of 
the Presidency, and retained a majority in the parliament, although it experienced a decline in 
popular support. In order to regain popularity, the Kuomintang enacted a series of reforms, intended 
to make the government bureaucracy more accountable to elected officials.  This report shows how 
the reforms in the Republic of China led to greater influence for the parliament on the broad 
contours of policy-making. It document how the executive of the Republic retains sole authority to 
set the state budget, and how the parliament had made inroads into the implementation of state 
policy.
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ABREVIATIONS 
 
DPP= the Democratic Progressive Party 
CPC= the Communist Party of China 
KMT= the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) 
NP= the New Party 
PRC= the People’s Republic of China 
ROC= the Republic of China 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND 
 
The Republic of China (ROC), commonly known as Taiwan, was first formally established in 1912 
in the mainland China. By 1927 civil war between the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party, 
KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) commenced. During the Second World War the 
KMT lost a lot of the popular support to the CPC, but even so the ROC managed to gain control 
over the island groups of Taiwan and Penghu with the defeat of the Japanese Empire. The KMT 
was totally defeated by 1949 and the CPC established the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 The 
Republic of China government that was mainly made of the KMT member fled to Taiwan, 
establishing itself there and continuing to claim of being the legitimate government over mainland 
China. At the same time, the PRC claimed to be rightful government over both mainland China and 
Taiwan area2. But the claims remained only claims as neither of the sides could afford or could 
ignore international pressure in starting a war. In 1971, the ROC lost reasonable hopes to regain 
mainland of China as the United Nations gave seat in the Security Council to the PRC3. This 
resulted in not only losing recognition as the legitimate government of all the China, but also as a 
polity. Even so, the ROC managed to keep Taiwan as their base and, furthermore, created one of the 
strongest economies in the world4.  
 
In 1987, the ROC lifted its martial law5 that originally prohibited various rights, like freedom of 
speech. It also allowed traveling and trading with the mainland China. Finally, it somewhat 
officially allowed opposition, thus, changing the ROC from a single to multi party state.  
                                                            
1 "History." Portal of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Web. 28 May 2010. 
2 "CIA - The World Factbook- Taiwan." The CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 28 May 2010. 
3 "History." Portal of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Web. 28 May 2010. 
4 "CIA - The World Factbook- Taiwan." The CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 28 May 2010. 
5 "History." Portal of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Web. 28 May 2010. 
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1.2 PROBLEM AREA 
 
In the late 1980s, the Republic of China (ROC) had moved towards democracy, with the first free 
elections held in 1992.1 Before 1987, power laid solely with the Kuomintang (KMT), until then the 
only legal party in the ROC, which was under martial law,2 suspending the constitution. Despite the 
introduction of free elections and political rights such as freedom of speech, the KMT managed to 
retain control until 2000.3 This gave the KMT significant influence over the changes to the ROC 
governmental system which took place in the 1990s. This is not to say that the opposition, 
spearheaded by the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), was insignificant, but they had less direct 
means to attain influence. 
 
We wish to examine to what extent the changes made between 1987 and 2000 influenced the 
making of policy in the ROC. Can a formerly-authoritarian party like the KMT be trusted to enact 
changes which will make it easier for other parties to gain influence? The ROC has traditionally had 
a powerful bureaucracy.4 How did the bureaucracy react to the introduction of elected officials as 
legislators? 
 
For the purpose of our examination, government 'policy' is defined broadly. It encompasses the laws 
implemented by the government, the guidelines for how to implement such laws, what public 
employees actually do to implement (or impede) policy, and the result of the actions taken by the 
many different members of the public sector. Accordingly, 'policy-making' consists of every kind of 
input that can influence the actions carried out by government employees.5 
 
In our examination of policy-making in the Republic of China, we intend to focus on the various 
actors which seek to influence policy, and their methods. With the move towards democracy, it has 
become legal for a larger group of actors to seek influence on policy. The formal channels through 
which citizens and interest groups may seek influence have also been expanded. We wish to 
                                                            
1 Rigger, Shelley. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. p.162 
2 Chai, Winberg. The Transformation of the Mass Media in Taiwan since 1950: Introduction.  p.134 
3 Baum, Jeehyang Rhee. Breaking Authoritarian Bonds: The Political Origins of the Taiwan Administrative Procedure 
Act.  p.375 
4 Tan, Qingshan. Democratization and bureaucratic restructuring in Taiwan. p.49 
5 Lindblom, Charles E. and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. p.60-61 
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investigate how these changes to the input for policy-making have been integrated into the policy-
making process of the ROC. 
 
When it comes to providing input to the policy-making process, an important distinction must be 
drawn between the incumbent government, and the opposition or citizenry at large. Whichever 
party controls the executive and/or the majority of the legislative branches of the state also had the 
most direct influence on policy-making. Members of parliament and the executive have access to 
information directly from the administrative bureaucracy and have the authority to broadly decide 
which kind of policies should be implemented by the state. These factors define the incumbent 
government.  
 
In marked contrast, the opposition and citizens have to rely on more indirect means of influence like 
establishing broad public support, providing criticism of policy proposals and providing 
alternatives, and building rapport with members of the bureaucracy. These methods are also 
available to the government, but others have to rely on them entirely. 
 
To structure our analysis, we intend to use four different theories about policy-making. Here 
follows a brief description of these and our use of them for our analysis, which will be expanded 
upon later in this report.  
 
Giovanni Sartori has worked on the structure of single and multi party policies.1 It will help us 
understand how the framework of the Republic of China shifted during the democratization period 
in the nineties, and how that framework influences policy-making. To understand how decisions are 
made within an existing political system, we use two distinct but supplementary theories. First, we 
intend to apply Anthony Downs’ classic theory about policy-making as consisting of rational 
choices, taken to achieve an individual or groups goals with the smallest use of resources2. Second, 
we apply the theory of C. Lindblom and E. Woodhouse on policy-making. Here they explain how 
actual policy can become quite disconnected from any particular goal. This occurs because policy-
makers have limited resources, information and time at their disposal, as well as mutually 
incompatible goals.3 Finally we use toe work of Robert A. Dahl, who provides some (relatively) 
                                                            
1 Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems. 
2 Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
3 Lindblom, Charles E. and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. 
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concrete strategies historically used by democratic parties to gain influence while in opposition.1  
That work will help clarify the extent to which the DPP and other opposition parties could act to 
gain influence before the 2000 change of power. 
 
We intend for our analysis to shed light on the results of the democratization process, but also on 
why the KMT initiated it in the first place. Historically, democratization has usually taken place 
when a government has lost its legitimacy and capability to govern effectively. Since this was not 
the case with the KMT, it seems somewhat counter-intuitive that they would deliberately limit their 
own power.  
 
1.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
How did the shift in party system affect the policy process in the ROC government?  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. How did the shift in party systems affect the appointment of bureaucrats and elected officials in 
the Republic of China?  
 
This question will help us investigate the two different party systems both theoretically and in case 
of the ROC. We will further analyze in how the allocation of government employees (both elected 
and appointed) changed with the shift in party systems, as they are the main actors in policy making 
by backing up the empirical data with theories on single and multi party systems and shift from one 
to another.  
 
2. How did the decision making of the bureaucrats and elected officials change in the shift? 
 
Learning on how decisions are made theoretically will help analyze on how decision making is 
influenced by the way of employee allocation in the government, which was in the case of the ROC 
affected by the shift in party systems.  This will lead to further analysis on how policies are made. 
                                                            
1Dahl,  Robert A. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. 
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3. What kind of impact do the bureaucrats and elected officials have over the policy-making 
process? 
 
This research question will sum up the analysis done before and show how the shift in party 
systems affected decisions in the policy process taking into consideration what power do 
bureaucrats and the elected officials have over it. The policy process itself will be also taken into 
consideration. Thus, producing half of our analysis and conclusion on how policy process was 
affected by the shift in party systems from the view point of the government. 
 
4. To what extent could other parties push their agenda in the policy process while in opposition to 
the KMT? 
 
Last research question will provide with knowledge on what power did opposition that was 
theoretically legalized with the lifting of the martial law in 1987 have over the policy process and 
how much the policy process was dependent on the government alone. We assume that in single-
party system the answer is simple, as the opposition had no power at all and everything was decided 
by the ruling party. But with the shift in the party system, opposition rose and could propose and 
push their ideas that could become actual policies.  
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1.5 THEORETICAL SELECTION 
 
In our initial examination of the democratization process in the ROC, we observed a few trends.  
First, the introduction of democratic elections led to a decline in KMT influence in the Legislative 
Yuan and in local politics.1  Second, democratization was followed by an increase in political 
oversight of the bureaucracy.2  Third, the Legislative Yuan became more assertive towards the 
executive and the bureaucracy.3 
 
Since we understand policy to be a matter of broad influences, carried out by many participants, we 
decided to utilize theories that examine the mechanics of group decision-making. More specifically, 
how the interaction between the goals of a group, and the personal interests and other goals of its 
members shape the methods of that group. In addition, we have sought theories that examine how 
control of information in a group can influence that groups policy. After all, it is impossible for a 
group to make decisions about issues that are not mentioned. 
 
The theories we chose emphasize the importance of groups when it comes to policy-making.  This 
focus on groups automatically leads to a de-emphasizing of the role of the individual. There are two 
main reasons for this choice. First, as the ROC moved away from being a one-party state, authority 
became less centralized. This means that the importance of personal connections to high-level 
officials has diminished in importance. Second our focus lies on the process itself, not on the 
motivation of the people who enacted the changes to formal policy-making. 
                                                            
1 Baum, Jeehyang Rhee. Breaking Authoritarian Bonds: The Political Origins of the Taiwan Administrative Procedure 
Act.  p.378 and p.379 
2 Tan, Qinshan.  Democratization and bureaucratic restructuring in Taiwan.  p.49 and p.55-57 
3 Ibid. p.51 and p.52 
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1.6 EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
Most of our selected empirical data has been taken from online databases with Peer-reviewed 
journal articles, databases such as CSA, Illumina and Ebscohost. We have also used official 
websites from the ROC, the KMT and the DPP.  The peer-reviewed articles especially have 
provided information we need about the change in the ROC’s politics, especially during the single-
party system, and the changes enacted in the nineties. Because that the news from the single-party 
period was under rigid control by the KMT government, the official data published were to a certain 
extent limited and biased, hence our need for non-ROC material. However, in the modern 
democratic multi-party period, we think the official websites in Taiwan are quite important and 
credible as primary data. We have also found articles like "Democratization and Bureaucratic 
Restructuring in Taiwan" from local Taiwanese scholars, written after the democratization period. 
In addition we have used sources in Chinese, which has provided our group a unique opportunity to 
research data for our project. 
 
 
12 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THEORIES 
 
2.1 SINGLE AND MULTI PARTY SYSTEMS 
 
Theories of political philosopher Giovanni Sartori on party systems help us analyze single and multi 
party systems as such and how a shift between them happens. We will use his work “Parties and 
party systems” (1976) and Andrew Heywood’s textbook “Politics” (2007), where the latter 
discusses Sartori’s work. This information will be a framework in analyzing the ROC government 
as a single-party system and its shift to multi party system in the process of democratization.  
 
Single-party 
 
At its most basic, a single-party system is when “Only one party exists and is allowed to exist.”1 
Thus, all power is concentrated is in the hands of the members of the party. In most of the cases 
higher ranking party members are also appointed into higher ranking government positions. Sartori 
distinguishes three sub-types of single-party systems: one-party totalitarian, one-party authoritarian 
and one-party pragmatic.  
 
In one-party totalitarianism government, which is absolutely ruled by the single party, pursues “the 
highest degree of pervasiveness, mobilization, and monopolistic control of the party upon the total 
life experience of the citizens.”2 The control extends in all the areas and as totalitarian parties are 
strongly ideological, decision making is rather concentrated in the hands of a small group.  
 
On the contrary, by definition, “the authoritarian regime lacks a strong ideology and a comparable 
mobilizational capability; and its control does not extend, as a rule, far beyond the normal 
instruments of power- thereby including, however, the judiciary.”3 Thus, even though in single-
party system that one party has all the power, a government in one-party authoritarianism does not 
and/ or has not the power to pervade and/or control citizen personal life. This type of single-party 
system can also be characterized as “exclusionary”4, where it restricts “the political activities of the 
                                                            
1 Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems. p.221 
2 Ibid. p.222 
3 Ibid. p.222 
4Ibid. p.226 
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outs”.1 One of the side effects is that as many sub-groups are unable to participate in politics, by 
purposely keeping out of it, they are left to pursue their own course; further resulting in gaining 
influence among the society.  
 
As Sartori describes “the totalitarian and the authoritarian polities are assumed to reflect different 
ideological intensities, while the one-party pragmatic polities represent that end of the continuum at 
which an ideological mentality gives way to a pragmatic mentality.” 2  This means that while 
totalitarian and authoritarian parties contain ideologies in different intensity, pragmatic type of 
parties avoid them.  
 
Different examples could be taken to illustrate these three sub-types of the single-party systems. 
The Republic of China, before the lifting of the martial law in 1987, was an excellent example of a 
single-party system, where only one party, the Kuomintang, was legal. Differently from many 
contemporary single- party governments, the ROC was rather one-party authoritarian than one-party 
totalitarian or one-party pragmatic. 
 
In the late 1980s the ROC shifted away from the single-party system. Sartori presents a great 
discussion in how to define the system, how to “count” the parties. The status of the ROC pre-1987 
is very clear, but as democratization process advanced the status became more and more 
ambiguous. We have decided to choose a multi-party system model for our further analysis.  
 
Multi-party 
 
Theoretically a multi-party system can be characterized “by competition amongst more than two 
parties, reducing the changes of single-party government and increasing the likelihood of 
coalitions”3, where “(i) No party is likely to approach, or at least to maintain, an absolute majority, 
and (ii) the relative strength (or weakness) of the parties can be ranked according to their respective 
coalition indispensability (or dispensability) and/ or (iii) their eventual potential of intimidation 
(blackmail).”4 Sartori distinguishes two major patters of multiparty systems: moderate and polarized 
pluralist systems.  
                                                            
1 Ibid. p.226 
2 Ibid. p.223 
3 Heywood, Andrew. Politics.  p.287 
4 Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems. p.127-128 
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Moderate pluralism features “(i) a relatively small ideological distance among its relevant parties, 
(ii) a bipolar coalitional configuration, and (iii) centripetal competition.”1 This means that even 
though there are a number of parties they are all ideologically close, furthermore decreasing 
differences in both cooperation and competition among parties. Moreover, Sartori outlines that 
coalitions are the main feature for moderate pluralism. 2  While in polarized pluralism, the 
differences between the major parties are so grave that they are both unable and unwilling to work 
together, because of the ideological differences. In some cases, parties adopt the so called anti-
system stance, which “abides by a belief system that does not share the values of the political order 
within which it operates.” 3  Even so, that does not stop them from working from within by 
infiltration; thus, pushing their agenda.   
                                                            
1 Ibid. p.179 
2 Ibid. p.179 
3 Ibid. p.133 
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2.2 POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
 
For the purpose of this report, 'policy-making', 'the policy-making process', and 'the policy process' 
will be used interchangeably. Policy-making starts when an individual or a group comes with a 
proposal for government action. 1  A political party, a ministry, an interest group or even an 
individual sees a social circumstance that requires action.2 This action should be taken by the 
government to alleviate, deal with or solve the perceived problem. In order to help understand the 
move from a perceived problem to action and the results of that action, the process can be divided 
into four parts.3 Although this division is to some degree a simplification4, it can provide structure 
to an otherwise muddled process. 
 
The first part of any policy making is policy initiation. This is the part where an issue (or issues) is 
brought up for deliberation. This can be done by anyone who can come to the attention of the public 
and/or the government. This generally requires some measure of political contacts, media access, 
and funding5. Just as important is the ability of the media and politicians to prevent an issue from 
being raised, by raising other issues or not mentioning a subject. The ability to influence what issues 
are brought up is called 'agenda setting'.6 7 
 
Once an issue has been brought up, it then proceeds to the stage of policy formulation. At this point, 
the idea that 'something must be done' is prevalent enough for government officials to discuss 
possible courses of action.8 The extent to which interest groups are formally consulted varies from 
state to state, but outside pressure generally has at least some influence.9 
 
Once a course of action has been decided upon, it is then time for the policy implementation. The 
very first step is to have the course of action signed into law. Government bureaucrats then have the 
task of finding ways to carry out this new law. The actual implementation may well turn out 
                                                            
1 Lindblom, Charles E., and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. p.129 
2 Heywood, Andrew. Politics.  p.430-431 
3 Ibid. p.430 
4 Lindblom, Charles E., and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. p.11-12 
5 Ibid. p.109-11 
6 Ibid. p.76 
7 Heywood, Andrew. Politics.  p.431 
8 Ibid. p.432 
9 Ibid. p.432-433 
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different from what was originally intended.1 2 The law may be vague, or bureaucracy resources 
limited. Both bureaucrats and other government employees such as teachers or policemen have a 
certain amount of leeway in carrying out their duties, at least in part to utilize their specialized skills 
and knowledge. Legislators also often deliberately leave defining the specifics up to the 
bureaucracy3. Often this process also brings to light new problems that lead to government action4. 
 
Once a policy has been implemented, it is possible to make a policy evaluation, if the government is 
willing to expend time and finances on examining the effect.5 6 Often, such funding is limited or 
non-existent and evaluation, if any, comes from outside sources like think-tanks. 7  When an 
evaluation does take place, it opens up for (potentially constructive) criticism of the policy and its' 
implementation. This means that an evaluation of policy often 'spills over' into future policy-
making, since it can both clarify problems with implementation and make new areas for policy 
apparent.8 However, as stated above, policy evaluation does not always take place. 
                                                            
1 Ibid. p.434-435 
2 Lindblom, Charles E., and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. p.59-61 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. p.11 
5 Ibid. p.11 
6 Heywood, Andrew. Politics.  p.435 
7 Ibid. 
8 Lindblom, Charles E., and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. p.11 
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2.3 ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
 
“Throughout the world, governments dominate the economic scene.”1 Even though the statement 
was made in 1957, the situation prevails; governments are the main actors in deciding upon taxation 
systems, they implement policies on international trade and control domestic affairs. Where 
governments rule over the economic scene, at the same time they are also controlled by internal 
economic goals. Anthony Downs’ work “An economic theory of democracy” will unite rational 
choice theory and basic assumption proposed by Adam Smith that “We address ourselves not to 
[other people’s] humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of 
their advantages.”2 This basic assumption can be equally applied to politics. Thus, in the project we 
agree upon the self-interest axiom to be the basis for the actions undertaken by the government. 
 
Downs considers quite a few ideas on how to explain democratic governments in economic terms. 
His first assumption is that people (or “men” as Downs states) are rational, because without this 
basic assumption, further theory cannot be developed. In economic terms, “rational man” is one that 
“moves toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible input 
of scarce resources per unit of valued output”3, thus receiving the most benefits with the least effort. 
Furthermore, rationality “refers to processes of action, not to their ends or even to their success at 
reaching desired ends.”4 That includes planning and carrying out of actions and most importantly 
being able to adjust actions in the course as to maximize output for a given input. Political parties, 
defined by Downs as coalitions of “men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal 
means”5, can also be defined in more economic terms as groups of rational people with a common 
goal.  
 
Moreover, Downs’ model in politics is implied on assumption “that every government seeks to 
maximize political support”6 The party that receives most of the votes in a democratic election 
theoretically gains the power over the entire government until the next election. This can alter as 
                                                            
1 Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. p.1 
2 Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations.  p.14 
3 Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. p.5 
4 Ibid. p.6 
5 Ibid. p.24 
6 Ibid. p.11 
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one party ex.: might not have enough votes to outvote other parties, and thus, have to go into 
coalitions with other parties (usually with similar ideology).   
 
Downs points out one major limit to the ruling party in a democratic government “the governing 
party… cannot hamper the operations of other political parties in society.” Thus, meaning that all 
rights like freedom of speech, or ability to compete cannot be suppressed. And a governing party in 
democratic government cannot change “the timing of elections, which recur at fixed intervals.”1 
However, the governing party economically has unlimited power, as it gets to decide upon taxes, 
spending, policies, etc. Taken into extremes, it can nationalize or privatize capital. The only 
economic restraint is that it cannot pass policies aimed at injuring their opponents.  
 
So, taking all these concepts and assumptions into consideration, it can be assumed that parties “act 
solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office”2, further 
implying that politicians (those party members that actually are in the government) advocate 
policies to succeed in an election and gain power, instead of winning an election in order to execute 
policies, pursue their ideology.  
                                                            
1 Ibid. p.12 
2 Ibid. p.28 
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2.4 INCREMENTAL THEORY 
 
In their theory on the policy-making process, C. Lindblom and J. Woodhouse attempt to describe 
how policy is made, not in general, but in modern, bi- or multiparty democracies. More specifically, 
how policy-making involves a vast amount of actors, and how less tangible social forces also affect 
the policy process. Elected functionaries, civil servants, and interest groups all play a role in the 
process. Their priorities all take part in shaping policy-making1. The limits of human cognition also 
shape policy-making, insofar as human thoughts are restrained by varying knowledge of different 
areas, different skills, and opposing understandings of the world. These include how humans act, 
how society works, what a desirable society is and so on.2 Beyond cognitive limits, decision-
making is also impacted by more obvious constraints. Policies have to be made within a certain 
time frame, and investigations carried out within certain budgets. Therefore, the amount of 
information available when policies are decided upon and implemented will always be limited3. 
 
By focusing on the limits of elected and appointed functionaries, it is possible to examine the extent 
to which government officials can influence the policy-making process. Examining the practical 
and cognitive limits of officials can also provide insight into the way their priorities are shaped. 
 
Concepts 
 
Policy-making 
All actions carried out by members of a government, from 'street-level' teachers and policemen to 
the official head(s) of government are to be understood as policy.4 This is important because there 
are usually gaps between legislation and practice. This can be due to a variety of reasons like 
legislators may deliberately leave the implementation up to bureaucrats and 'street-level' employees, 
law may be vague or there is insufficient funding, etc.5  
 
                                                            
1 Lindblom, Charles E., and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. p.4-5 
2 Ibid. p.5-6 and p.19 
3 Ibid. p.16-18 and p.20-21 
4 Ibid. p.60 
5 Ibid. p.60-61 
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While members of a government have the most direct impact on policy-making, input from other 
sources can be at least sometimes as important.1 Interest groups can have both formal and informal 
influence, but social 'forces' also play a role.  
 
The way different people perceive the world shapes what are considered social problems, the ideal 
society, and viable methods2. 
 
Analysis 
According to Lindblom and Woodhouse, analysis one needs to “gather facts, interpret them and 
debate issues.”3  This has two important implications. First, interpretation by definition differs 
between people even when examining the same thing. Second, in order for there to be a debate, 
different interpretations must be brought forward.  
 
Analysis can make relevant information more accessible to those involved in policy-making4. It 
allows specialist within their field to convey their knowledge to others, potentially enlightening 
debates about policy5. When analysis is provided from outside the government apparatus, such as 
by interest groups, research centers and opposition groups, it can help expand the modes of thought 
available for discussion6.  
 
The limits of analysis 
Despite the benefits of analysis, it has many limits. First, analysis requires time, specialized skills, 
and funding. The more of these resources are devoted to analysis, the longer, more involved, and 
more expensive the policy-making process will be. Thus, analysis has to be weighted against the 
desire for relatively fast and inexpensive policy. Since policy-making takes place within certain 
time-frames, there are hard limits on how much analysis can be made and put to use.7 
 
Beyond the limits imposed on analysis by the availability of resources, there are further difficulties. 
No analysis is perfect. Any and all attempts will have flaws, large or small. There may be 
insufficient data available, or analysts may make unfounded assumptions or conclusions, and the 
                                                            
1 Ibid. p.1 and  p.4 
2 Ibid. p.3-5 and p.10-11 
3 Ibid. p.13 
4 Ibid. p.13-14 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. p.15 
7 Ibid. p.20-21 
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relations between different variables may be unknown or misunderstood1. Likewise, the recipients 
of analysis are also flawed. Policy-makers may be unable or unwilling to understand analysis, may 
disagree with basic assumptions or premises, and whether a situation is problematic at all2. The use 
of analysis also requires time.  
 
No matter how much a report may condense information, reading and processing it is not instant. So 
resource constraints matter with both the creation and application of analysis3. Even when well-
made and acknowledged, it is by no means certain that analysis may point to acceptable or easily 
implemented policies. Since social interactions are exceedingly complex4, policies that benefit one 
group may well be detrimental to another5.  Finally, policies may be very resource-intensive to 
implement.  
 
Functionaries  
In order to emphasize that policy-making involves a multitude of actors, Lindblom and Woodhouse 
introduce the term 'functionary'. This means government officials in positions of authority, whether 
elected (politicians), or appointed (bureaucrats)6. Lindblom and Woodhouse consider that “it is 
misleading to refer to those in positions of authority as 'the policy makers' or 'leaders' or 'decision 
makers'.” 7  As mentioned, the implementation of policy is influenced by all members of 
government, and policy is both supplied and structured by outside forces and organizations. 
 
'Intelligent' decision-making 
For the purpose of assessing how well-functioning the policy-making process is, Lindblom and 
Woodhouse have made a tentative set of three requirements. In order to be considered intelligent, 
policy making must possess “responsiveness to public sentiment, sensible tradeoffs [between 
different interests/goals], and attention to relevant information.”8 
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5 Ibid. p.19 
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8 Ibid. p.26 
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Since there is no unanimously accepted idea of the ‘common good’,1 Lindblom and Woodhouse 
propose attempting to make policy that can cover at least relatively widespread ideas of what 
desirable policy is. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider somewhat extensive discussion that 
covers both the ideas and opinions citizenry at large, and the influential organizations that impact 
policy-making.2 By ensuring that policies are to some extent appealing to large parts of policy-
makers, it becomes easier to establish new policy,3 and changing old policy. This needs to make 
policy seem appealing to many means that policies usually make small, incremental changes to 
existing policy, hence the name of the theory.4 
 
By including information and ideas from a somewhat extensive area to form the basis of discussion, 
it is possible to have a ‘competition of ideas’.5 This competition can help lead to policy that can 
better achieve the intended effect(s), while minimizing undesirable effects.6 However, while this 
competition is relatively stronger in modern democracies than in authoritarian regimes,7 it is by no 
means equal.8 This is unfortunate, since the more balanced the discussion is, the better it can serve 
as a basis for policy-making.9 
 
Basic assumptions 
 
Lindblom and Woodhouse's theory builds on three key assumptions. The first of these assumptions 
is relatively simple. Namely, society and social interaction is exceedingly complex.10 The second 
assumption is that the human capacity for reasoning has several limits. Most humans have difficulty 
understanding complexly interrelating matters, which leads to a sometimes unhelpful tendency to 
compartmentalize objects of study.11 Humans also have a tendency to get emotionally involved with 
abstract concepts, such as political ideologies.12 Capacity to reason is further influenced by the 
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5 Ibid. p.7 
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upbringing, in which both parents and teachers tend to emphasize obedience over critical thinking.1 
Expectations to conform to the standards of one’s peers also tend to disincline to non-standard lines 
of reasoning.2 
 
These two assumptions that society is complex and humans are poor at understanding complexity 
leads to the third assumption. It is impossible for any single human to comprehend society as a 
whole.3 This leads to many of the limits on the use of analysis, as mentioned above. 
 
Summary of relations between theoretical concepts 
 
Put shortly, the concepts of incremental theory relates in the following way. Analysis can help with 
intelligent decision-making. The limits of analysis mean that there is also a need for political 
discussion. Government officials, including high-ranked functionaries, do not and cannot have 
complete control of policy-making. Input can come from both inside and outside the government. 
 
Implementation is often determined by lower-ranking government officials prioritizing of time and 
resources. An open discussion of ideas within the government, and between government officials 
and members of the public can aid in intelligent decision making. 
 
The applicability of the incremental theory 
 
Incremental theory can provide a framework for understanding how policy-making functions, in a 
system with more than one political party.  This in turn provides some measure of insight into how 
the Republic of China's move towards a multiparty system has impacted policy-making. 
 
In order to assess how policy-making has been changed, it is necessary to research the amount of 
decision-making delegated to the bureaucracy. Other things equal, the greater control bureaucrats 
have over policy-making, the less holding elections will matter. On the other hand, significant 
bureaucratic influence means that being consulted by the bureaucracy increases in importance. 
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The amount to which the government consults outside sources influences how easily opposition 
parties may influence policy-making. Opposition members in parliament have some influence in 
their role as legislators, being able to provide criticism and counter-proposals for policy. Similarly, 
consistent access to and use of the media can help influence policy by putting issues on the public 
agenda. Access to the bureaucratic apparatus is also crucial for influencing policy, since many 
decisions are made by the bureaucracy. The current government is guaranteed access to the 
bureaucracy. Such access can also be achieved by opposition parties or their allies, in the form of 
think-tanks, unions or other interest groups.  
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2.5 OPPOSITION THEORY 
 
To get a better understanding of opposition role and strategies of acting in the government we are 
going to use opposition theory. 
The political opposition is prevailed when one or more political parties or other organizations are 
opposing to the government. The degree of opposition depends on the political situation of the 
country1, for example in ROC there were no opposition during the authoritarian rule of KMT, and 
with the democratization process, oppositional parties and organizations emerged and started to 
make influence to the government. 
 
To analyze how the opposition has settled in the process of changing from single to multi party 
system and to what extent they could affect the policy process we are going to use the theory on 
political opposition of Robert A. Dahl. His theory will help us estimate which patterns of opposition 
are most reflected in the ROC opposition parties. In his works, Dahl presents patterns of opposition:  
• “The organizational cohesion or concentration of opponents; 
• The competitiveness of opposition;  
• The site or setting for the encounter between opposition and those who control the 
government; 
• The distinctiveness or identifiability of the opposition; 
• The goals of the opposition;  
• The strategies of the opposition.”2 
We are going to look deeper into four of these patterns, which are most relevant to our case. These 
are: competitiveness, site or setting for the encounter between opposition and those who control the 
government, goals and strategies of opposition. 
 
The competiveness 
 
Dahl defines an opposition as the way in which the gains and losses of political opponents in 
elections and parliament are related. According to him the level of competitiveness can be measured 
by taking into account the concentration of opposition (number and nature of parties) and strict 
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competitiveness on key votes in legislature (votes on the formation of government, votes of 
confidence, votes on the major legislative and budgeting measures submitted by the government, 
etc.) 
 
He distributes the competitiveness trough the party systems. Competitiveness in the two party 
systems he describes as mostly strictly competitive, while he states that in the multi party systems 
strict competition is unlikely; in fact unless one party can form a majority by itself, strict 
competition is actually impossible, for unless two parties are willing to enter onto a coalition, no 
majority can be formed. Moreover, parties may not be strictly competitive even during elections, for 
they may enter into electoral alliances that limit competition in various ways.1 
 
Site or setting for the encounter between opposition and those who control the government 
 
Dahl defines site as: “The situation or circumstances in which an opposition employs its resources 
to bring about a change might be called a site for encounters between opposition and government.”2 
These different circumstances are means of getting more influence in policy process. Dahl 
distributes the oppositions by the decisiveness of the sites they have chosen. According to him there 
are four patterns of decisiveness: 
• Parliamentary elections are relatively decisive. By winning a parliamentary majority, the 
opposition is able to select the executive; and because of party unity the onetime opposition, 
now the new government, can count upon its majority in the parliament to support its 
policies.3 This site is typical for two-party system. 
• Elections are not decisive (even though they are important).  An important thing is 
formation of the coalition, because executive coalition can be sure of gaining parliamentary 
support for the policies agrees on. While groups which are not in the coalition have way less 
chance to gain support for their policies. Hence, the elects shape their strategy to take 
advantage of opportunities for bargaining their way into the current coalition, replacing it 
with a different coalition, or forcing new elections that are expected to improve their 
bargaining position.4 This site is mostly typical to multi-party system. 
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•  The selection of the executive coalition is decisive only with respect to other official sites-
parliament, the bureaucracies, local governments, and so on. But on a variety of key issues 
bargaining has been displaced from these official sites to “bargaining processes between the 
giant alliances of associations and corporation.”1 
•  Even among officials none sites are decisive. For the absence of a decisive site has been 
produced by a deliberate dispersion of legal authority through constitutional devices such as 
federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances.2 
 
Goals and strategies 
 
It is obvious that every opposition has its own goals. Robert A. Dahl postulated that certain goals, 
whether long-run or short-run, public or private, are “dominant” or “controlling”; and he 
distinguished between aims or goals and strategies.3  The controlling goals are the objectives, which 
oppositions seeks to arrive at by changing the conduct of the government, and strategy consists of 
the means how to achieve those objectives.  Opposition to the conduct of the government may act in 
order to change (or prevent the change) in personnel of government, specific policies of 
government, political structure and socio-economic structure. 
 
Rober A. Dahl proposes 6 strategies of opposition which they exercise to obtain their goals. 
 
Strategy 1: Opposition will concentrate above all on strict competition by seeking to gain enough 
votes in elections to win majority of seats in parliament and then to form a government (cabinet or 
executive) consisting only of its own leaders. This strategy is encouraged by a system characterized 
by two unified parties, where opposition is highly distinctive, and elections are decisive.4 
 
Strategy 2: An opposition will try to convert additional voters and to gain additional seats in 
parliamentary elections, but it will assume that it cannot win a parliamentary majority; hence it will 
concentrate heavily on entering into a governing coalition and gain as much as it can by intra-
coalition bargaining. This strategy is encouraged by system with more than two major parties that 
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have a high degree of party unity, and where the selection of the government (i.e. cabinet or 
executive) is relatively decisive.1 
 
Strategy 3: An opposition will adopt all of the 2nd strategy, but in addition it will assume that many 
important decisions will be made in quasi-official bargaining among giant associations; hence 
failure to get into the cabinet need not prevent it from gaining some of its goals by hard bargaining 
on these quasi-official encounters. This strategy is encouraged by multi-party systems in which the 
2nd strategy is appropriate, but in which addition there exist a rather highly developed structure of 
democratic corporatism.2 
 
Strategy 4: Oppositions will assume that gaining public support and winning votes in elections are 
both important but neither is always necessary or sufficient, since any one of a great variety of sites 
may prove decisive in a specific case and none will prove generally decisive. Hence an opposition 
will adapt its specific tactics to its recourses and to the most vulnerable site or sites. It may 
concentrate on pressure group activities, intraparty bargaining, legislative maneuvering, gaining 
favorable judicial decisions, actions in state and local levels, winning elections, or combination of 
these. This kind of strategy is encouraged by a system in which constitutional rules and practice 
prevent any site from being decisive and where opportunities for preventing or inhibiting 
government action are numerous.3 
 
Strategy 5: is pursued by an opposition committed to the survival of the political entity when the 
opposition and the government believe that survival is seriously threatened by severe internal crisis, 
subversion, war, or the like.4 
 
Strategy 6: is often pursued by revolutionary oppositions committed to the destruction of the 
political entity or the main features of its constitutional system. The essence of this strategy is to use 
whatever resources the revolutionary opposition has available in order to disrupt the normal 
operation of political processes, to discredit the system, to impair its legitimacy, and, in general, to 
increase the vulnerability of the polity to seizure of power by the revolutionary opposition.5 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 THE AFFECT OF THE SHIFT IN PARTY SYSTEMS ON THE ALLOCATION OF 
BUREAUCRATS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS IN THE ROC 
 
In the 1980’s ROC moved towards democratization. One of the changes in the democratization 
process affected on was switching from single-party system to multi-party system and this change 
caused the transformation in appointment of bureaucracy1 and elected officials.  
 
In 1949, following a civil war against communist forces, the Kuomintang-led ROC government 
relocated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland and ruled the island under authoritarian regime with 
one-party dominance2.  
 
As said before, single-party system is when “the only party exists and is allowed to exist” and 
Sartori distinguishes three sub-types of single-party systems: one-party totalitarian, one-party 
authoritarian and one-party pragmatic, which differs in level of control and strength of ideology. In 
ROC case, under martial law (1949-1987), the KMT-controlled government imposed press 
censorship, banned new political parties, and restricted the freedoms of speech, publication, 
assembly and association. Moreover, from 1950 to 1952, the KMT created a network of party cells 
throughout the government, military, and society to with each party member had to belong.3  
However there was no control over private life of citizens as long as it did not interfere with policy.  
Furthermore, even under authoritarian rule some direct elections for local government heads and 
local legislative council seats were initiated in 1950.4 These features of the KMT govern shape an 
authoritarian form of ROC polity. 
 
The organizational principles of democratic centralism, ideology as guide to policy, hierarchical 
authority, and party authority over the government bureaucracy and the military were reasserted by 
the KMT.5 “In addition to stifling critical voices, the KMT also altered the domestic environment 
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by cooping local elites and local factions into the party.”1 “Opportunities for exit and voice were 
tightly controlled. Moreover, only local leaders were directly elected. Voters selected 
representatives for legislative bodies as high as the provincial assembly, but direct elections for 
executive posts were limited to the county level and below. The provincial governor and all central 
government ministers were appointed by the KMT, and central supplementary bodies (the National 
Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and control Yuan) elected on the mainland did not face reelection on 
the ROC. Even so, supplementary elections were occasional held to replace legislators who died 
and to marginally increase the number of Taiwanese. Local elections have been a major element in 
the KMT’s work since its retreat to the island of Taiwan.”2 Elections were not a referendum on 
party policies, because voters were not offered much of a choice among candidates. The ban of 
formation of new parties was become operative and although minor parties Youth party and the 
Social Democratic party existed, they were “fraternal” “parties that did not constitute a viable 
opposition neither could be elected”.3 The “powerless” the opposition lead KMT to extend its 
authority by incorporating local leaders and their fractions, which being politically ambitious joined 
the party because  the “KMT nomination virtually guaranteed election”4. For each of the factions 
KMT guaranteed “equal number of government offices and an equal cut of spoils that went with 
them”5. One of the examples could be county level (large cities of Taipei and Kaoshiung were 
included as well) elections in 1950 to 1952. The KMT took advantage of its power and authority 
and weakness of ROC local organization by nominating its party members, even though they were 
mainlanders, or not suitable for the post, or belonged to outside the local area. 6 Because all the 
candidates were party members, KMT was guaranteed a victory. This situation continued for over 
twenty years. During these years, “no other parties provided the means for political participation, 
because at the local level it was channeled through local fractions, and therefore trough KMT,7 also 
candidates were chosen through non-democratic procedures generally at the discretion of local party 
comities”8. 
 
Under the authoritarian rule all the ROC governmental bodies were accountable only to the KMT 
top leadership - bureaucracy and elected officials were not an exception. Due to its relative 
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autonomy, insulation from politics, and non-existence of legislative over-sight, bureaucracy was 
able to make and implement policies. One can say that the party could be seen as the patron, 
insulating bureaucracy apparatus from public pressure and other political accountability. 
 
In early 1970’s KMT invigorated elections to serve as a feedback mechanism on the party’s 
performance. Party members were given more opportunities to seek elected office, thus 
discouraging another form of exit – leaving the party to run is independent candidates, voters were 
offered better qualified candidates and opposition parties were allowed to express criticism, that 
was not the case before.1  Furthermore, “election work shifted from balancing local factions to 
combating to emerging political opposition, the dangwai. “2 
 
September 1986, the opposition leaders, the dangwai, established the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) in defiance of the ban on the formation of new political parties. This was one of the reasons 
for the lifting of the martial law in 1987 and start of reforms.  President Chiang Kai-shek  started the 
reforms, but soon he passed away and in the 1996 first presidential election were held - Lee- Teng 
hui was elected in popular voting( while before the changes president and vice president had been 
appointed by the National Assembly) continued what Chiang Kai-shek  started. The new president 
initiated reforms in the political system of ROC and dismantled the party-state machinery that had 
been in place in the ROC for the preceding four decades.3 Under his administration, the press was 
given greater freedom4, opposition political parties developed, private visits to the PRC increased 
dramatically, because the ban on private visits to mainland China was repealed in 19875, and the 
Constitution was revised to provide regular elections of Legislative Yuan, National Assembly and 
the president.6   The main political parties of the ROC were Kuomintang and opposition Democratic 
progressive party. Applying the theory of Sartori, one can say that this system fits to the second 
major pattern of multi party systems - polarized pluralism, because as he defines, the differences 
between the major parties are so grave that they are both unable and unwilling to work together, 
because of the ideological difference or in this case huge differences are in their goals concerning 
ROC political status. However, there were some exceptions, when DPP and KMT managed to work 
together for the 1991 reform of constitution.  
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The democratization process and move towards multi-party system weakened the dominance of the 
Kuomintang in the Legislative Yuan and reduced the power in appointing “their people” in the 
government bodies1 -“A new phase of legislative politics featured party realignment between the 
KMT, the DPP, and the New Party(NP) in legislative voting. The recent round of legislative 
elections in 1998 further strengthened legislative power by increasing the total number of 
lawmakers from 164 to 255. As a consequence, a more assertive legislature emerged, exercising 
greater legislative oversight over the executive branch, especially over the bureaucracy.”2 This 
means that the KMT was no longer the only power that influenced and decided upon the executive 
branch. Moreover, in 1994, several autonomy laws like the Province and County Autonomy Law 
(PCAL) and the Special Municipality Autonomy Law (SMAL) were proposed to give local 
government a greater autonomy in selecting bureaucratic personnel and controlling local resources.3 
These laws were supposed to enable local government executive officials to be elected. In 1997, 
after intense negotiations between KMT and DPP, constitutional reform was made as an outcome of 
autonomy laws and battle between the KMT and the DPP broke out. “The reform fell short of 
abolishing the province as the DPP demanded, but drastically reduced the autonomy and power of 
the ROC province and amended the PCAL to subject the governor of the ROC to central 
appointment rather than to election.”4 This reform allowed for mayors of Taipei and Kaohsuing to 
make various political appointments, which was unavailable before and this power enabled to gain 
control of local administration traditionally staffed by career bureaucrats, many whom had 
established their careers under the wing of the centralized KMT government.5 After this law was 
established, the DPP captured the office of mayor of Taipei and made sweeping changes in the 
bureau and department levels (career bureaucrats were replaced by political appointees assigned to 
head different bureaus and departments).6  
 
 
Due to the growing pressure of opposition parties, there was a demand for change in the recruitment 
procedures of the civil servants. The Examination Yuan, which is one of the five branches of 
government, was responsible for the service affairs including civil service examinations, evaluating 
                                                            
1 Tan, Qingshan. "Democratization and Bureaucratic Restructuring in Taiwan."  Web. 25 May 2010. p.51 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. p.56 
4 Ibid. p.57 
5 Ibid. p.56 
6 Ibid. p.57 
34 
 
bureaucratic performance, and supervising personnel. The civil service was divided into fourteen 
ranks of bureaucratic hierarchy.1  For different level positions, candidates are required to take 
different types of examinations. There are three types of examination: general, higher and special 
examination. The special examination is created for police officers, diplomats, or custom officials 
and it is also adjusted to the retired military personnel to be hired into the bureaucracy. Even though 
this examination was established in 1967 to attract talent from overseas, it became corrupted and 
favored power holders. “It became a back door for the children of high power (who usually have 
degrees from foreign universities) and for people who have connections in high places.” 2 Even so, 
this system of recruitment still privileged military and the KMT establishment and it caused a high 
level of corruption. Due to these issues the Examination Yuan proposed an amendment to the Civil 
Service Examination Act, where changes in special examination with standardized, general system 
of examination and prevention of the politicization of civil services were presented.3 Unfortunately, 
from the viewpoint of military and legislators, as establishing the new law meant that bureaucratic 
positions were no longer easily available, which resulted in cancelation of the bill passage.  
 
All in all, during the authoritarian regime, from 1949 to the start of democratization in 1980’s, 
KMT was influencing all government bodies procedures, and political actors were accountable only 
to the KMT top leadership. With the process of democratization, opposition emerged and its 
pressure to the ruling party govern became more and more intensive. Due to this there were initiated 
changes, which weakened KMT power in Legislature Yuan and its influence in elections and 
appointment of civil service. However, the changes in implement multi party system were very 
gradual and it took a lot of time and efforts to reorganize standing situation because of the high-
powered KMT party and  prevailed corruption over government. 
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3.2 CHANGE IN WAY OF ALLOCATION AND DECISION MAKING 
 
Several factors can be pointed out in things that influence the priorities/ decision making of the 
bureaucrats and elected officials in a single-party system: ideology, political ranking and self-
interests. 
 
Even though ideology in a one-party authoritarian system is not as strong as it would be in a 
totalitarian system, but it still plays a part in the decision making of the government. Traditionally 
government officials who come from the same party are viewed to act as one, further implementing 
that they all act according to the ideology, as their choice to join a party is or supposed to be 
determined by the conformity of personal and party views. As in a single-party state government is 
equal to the party, thus, path a government takes (policies made, laws passed, etc.) can be equated 
to party ideology or in the case of an authoritarian regime- party line. This all very well fits to the 
incremental theory, which states that individuals as such do not play a role in policy process. But 
stating this would be overly simplistic especially in empirical research. The case of the ROC shows 
that many times people diverge from the theoretical frame. First problem arises when talking about 
the party-line of the KMT. Supposedly it is created and approved by the party members, but as it 
shows, especially in single-parties, the leader is the key in the party-line. In the ROC, the death of 
Cheng-Kai shek in 19751 marked beginning of different leadership as his son Chiang-Ching kuo 
took over the position of being both the party leader and the President of the ROC. Therefore, up 
until the lifting of the martial law, party-line was very much controlled by the party leaders, who 
were in fact family members.  
 
This strongly affected the priorities and decisions made on the lower levels as everybody had to 
succumb to members of the party in higher positions. Thus, common bureaucrats and elects had not 
only to watch for the party-line, but also for the interests of those more powerful than they were. 
And in many times, as they were appointed to certain positions because of their acquaintances 
instead of their qualifications, they always had to check their decisions with those who appointed 
them, rather than those who were qualified to judge. Finally, this all fits to Downs’ idea that 
everyone acts on its own benefit and in this case the benefit is to do what is best for oneself by not 
interfering with the higher ranking officials. And thus, as that were the only checks and balances 
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before 1987 it resulted in wide-spread corruption that dragged on much into the 1990s1 and one of 
the main reasons for the people to turn away from the KMT to other parties was that common idea 
was “under the KMT, corruption and cronyism thoroughly infested government at all levels.”2 
 
With the rising opposition proposing many reforms in dividing the power and creating new checks 
and balances, like the DPP’s proposal of the PCAL and the SMAL, influenced (the actual reform 
was done only in 1997 with a lot of change from the side of the KMT) the way government 
apparatus functioned and how the decisions among the bureaucrats and elected officials were done. 
As the KMT could no longer act as a patron to all its members, the biggest change was that instead 
of being accountable only to the party, now mass opinion started playing a key role. Especially for 
the elected officials, who now could belong to other parties rather than the KMT, and still be 
elected and take up posts that were all previously filled with members of the KMT and usually 
appointed rather than elected there by the KMT. This shifted preferences towards trying to satisfy 
the popular demand both by the party and party members to “maximize political support”3 in order 
to get re-elected.  
 
In the late 1990s corruption levels in the ROC started decreasing due to new reforms, thus, also 
diverting the priorities of the bureaucrats. As the reforms mentioned earlier dealt with division of 
power among more positions, many of which were filled through election, the KMT members 
filling in government positions could no longer go only checked by their party leadership. They 
became accountable to the nation, thus, having to shape their decisions accordingly, like when the 
KMT’s influence in the Executive Yuan decreased in the late 1990s, it could no longer claim to act 
in of the government to fulfill its financial concerns.  
 
All in all, the priorities of the bureaucrats and elects changed with the shift in party systems in a 
way that in order to get re-elected in the multi party system, which is the main goal according to 
Downs economic theory of democracy, and to retain positions decisions and priorities had to 
account for the welfare of the people who voted instead of the leaders of the KMT in the single 
party system. 
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3.3 IMPACT ON POLICY-MAKING BY BUREAUCRATS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS 
 
The relationship between bureaucrats and officials has changed significantly over the years in the 
ROC. The general trend has been a decrease in bureaucratic autonomy as accountability to the 
elected officials of the executive and legislative. And by extension, accountability to the citizenry. 
In other words, the balance has shifted in favor of elected officials. 
 
Before the democratization process, the Republic of China had a relatively powerful bureaucracy, 
with low accountability to the legislative or citizens, and closely intertwined with the KMT party 
apparatus.1  Since the KMT effectively was the government, this meant that the lines between 
bureaucratic functionaries and KMT ministers were rather blurred. With no particular need to 
appeal to the public at large, the success of bureaucrats and officials depended mainly upon the 
ability to establish policies that could advance the goals of the KMT. Since the bureaucracy had to 
answer to the top leadership of the KMT,2 there was no particular need to make it accountable to 
lower-ranking officials such as mayors. Paradoxically, the ties between the KMT and the 
bureaucracy meant that the latter could decide large swaths of policy, as well as control the 
implementation of said policy. The presence of large state-owned monopoly enterprises, 
administered by the bureaucracy, also gave great influence to the bureaucracy.3 These businesses 
were later privatized under the ownership of the KMT.4 
 
With the democratization process, this relationship has changed considerably. The formerly state-
owned enterprises have been privatized as the property of the KMT. The ties between the 
bureaucracy and the KMT had weakened, although for most of the nineties they were still relatively 
close. Most importantly, with the establishment of democratic elections to the Legislative Yuan, 
legislators became more assertive towards the bureaucracy.5 Especially opposition politicians from 
the DPP and the New Party (NP) had reason to seek increased influence, in order for them to be 
able to shape policies.  This led to a reform in 1994, which granted local government in the ROC 
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increased authority, including the ability to appoint administrators of the local bureaucracy.1 It 
should be noted that in the ROC, the executive is supposed to present budget proposals.  
The Legislative Yuan may decrease, but not increase, spending.2 This inability to increase funding 
significantly limits the legislature's ability to shape policy. The legislative does have the authority to 
reject or amend a proposed budget, assuming that such changes do not increase spending. This 
meant that as the KMT presence in the Legislate Yuan weakened, it became more difficult for the 
president and the bureaucracy to have policy proposals ratified.3 
 
During the nineties, the KMT retained the presidency and a majority in the Legislative Yuan. 
However, the party could no longer boast the 75% of the Yuan needed to reform the aged ROC 
constitution.4 This meant that the KMT had to give concessions to the opposition, in order to push 
its own reforms though. At the same time, the Legislative Yuan increasingly began to provide it's 
own policy proposals.5 The process of concessions to the opposition, and increased bureaucratic 
accountability culminated in a legal reform in 1999. According to the new rules, policy proposals 
must now be made available for public examination and comments, and the bureaucracy must 
respond to all such comments.6 This moved yet more decision-making authority away from the 
bureaucracy. 
 
This loss of authority should not be taken to mean that the bureaucracy no longer plays a significant 
role in policy-making. The bureaucracy remained the central source of knowledge and investigative 
analysis available to the ROC government. The 1999 reform has made the information available to 
the bureaucracy more accessible to elected officials and the public alike. However, the basic role of 
the bureaucracy to filter available data is still very important. Only the information deemed by the 
bureaucracy to be important is commonly presented to elected officials. This information provides 
an important framework within which policy decisions are made. After all, elected officials can 
only act upon the information made available to them, whether by bureaucrats or interest groups. 
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While the capability of the ROC bureaucracy to make large-scale decisions about policy has been 
limited, policy implementation is still largely in the hands of civil servants. As the main source of 
knowledge and expertise for the government, the bureaucracy provides the concrete ways to 
implement the kind of policies desired by elected officials. For this reason, it retains significant 
influence on the policy output of the ROC government. 
 
To some extent, local elected officials such as mayors can increase their influence on the 
bureaucracy by the use of political appointees.1 However, this involves a tradeoff between political 
loyalty and long-term administrative skills, since political appointees are usually replaced when 
their patron(s) leaves office. Career bureaucrats, on the other hand, can conceivable remain in 
administration for decades. 
 
As mentioned above, the members of the Legislative Yuan increasingly provide their own policy 
proposals. Alongside their authority to reject budget proposals, this gives them some influence over 
policy making on a large scale. Insofar as they can manage to gain public support, legislators can 
also lay pressure on the executive. The Legislative Yuans inability to provide funding for policy 
proposals hampers its ability to get policy enacted. However, both the Legislative Yuan and high-
ranking bureaucrats can exert considerably influence on how the budget is spent. This has led to 
cases of business interests providing financial support of political campaigning, in exchange for 
lucrative contracts with the government.2 In the same vein, there has been a tendency for the 
bureaucracy to give contracts to businesses associated with the KMT, such as the former state 
monopolies.3 Such corrupt practices generally come at the expense of cost-efficiency for the state. 
 
The cabinet of the ROC, the Executive Yuan, provides budget proposals. In addition, the officials of 
the executive have the most direct influence on the bureaucracy, since the majority of ministries sort 
under the Executive.4 The executive does not consist of elected officials, but are appointed by the 
president,5 although the Premier has to be ratified by the Legislative Yuan. This places the members 
of the Executive Yuan in a gray area between bureaucrats and elected officials. As the heads of 
various ministries, members of the executive have direct access to the information held by the 
                                                            
1 Tan, Qinshan. Democratization and bureaucratic restructuring in Taiwan.  p.57 
2 Baum, Jeehyang Rhee. Breaking Authoritarian Bonds: The Political Origins of the Taiwan Administrative Procedure 
Act. p 387 and p.388 
3 Ibid. p.385-388 
4 The Republic of China Year Book 2009. Web. 30 May 2010 
5 Democratic Progressive Party Official Website. Web. 29 May 2010 
40 
 
bureaucracy. Combined with the privilege of controlling funding, the executive is the organ of 
government most capable of championing policy proposals.  
 
The process of enacting policy proposals and implementing policy is further complicated by the 
differences between bureaucrats, elected officials, and the executive. Beyond the different rights 
available to these three groups, individual and sub-group differences also play a role.  
 
This is most clear in the Legislative Yuan, where the members are divided among party lines, with 
goals that are often at cross-purposes. However, individual functionaries and lower-ranking 
bureaucrats also tend to have different goals, knowledge, and means to pursue their goals. 
Legislators, bureaucrats, and members of the executive have different amounts of resources 
available, different responsibilities, different skills and different interests. The Ministry of Finance 
needs different data than the Ministry of Justice, both ministries  differ from legislators etc. This 
variation means that the various groups that make up the ROC government cannot be said to be 
unified. Bureaucrats, legislators and members of the executive work towards varying goals, with 
varying methods, action on varying levels of information.  
 
However, party leaders and functionaries do have sanctions of varying effectiveness to induce their 
subordinates to act according to the wishes of their superiors. For example, the 1994 reform of the 
local political system made it possible for mayors to have some measure of control of their local 
bureaucracy. 1  The 1999 reform to the procedures for bureaucratic policy proposals 2  can be 
understood in the same vein, to provide greater influence to the public, and by extension the 
legislators. Insofar as the KMT and DPP provide support for their members who campaign for 
office, they can induce party members to stay close to the party line by threatening to withhold 
support for future campaigns. A majority on the Legislative Yuan may reject budget proposals,3 or 
issue a vote of no confidence for the executive.4  In order to be feasible, such moves require that a 
party (or parties) with a majority also has tight discipline. Perhaps the most direct sanction belongs 
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to the President of the ROC. Since the President has the authority to appoint members  of the 
Executive Yuan,1 he can replace ministers who do not live up to his requirements. 
 
To summarize, the bureaucracy has lost its previous influence on policy decisions at the national 
and provincial level. It retains its influence on agenda setting provided by being the main source of 
information available to elected officials and the executive. The bureaucracy is still the primary 
source of policy implementation, with all the influence that implies, although elected politicians and 
the public have gained greater say.  
 
The Legislative Yuan has become increasingly active in agenda setting, and broad decisions on 
policy. However, so long as the legislative cannot establish further funding for their policies, their 
influence on policies remain limited. The Legislative Yuan does have some say on policy 
implementation, though not to the detailed extent of the bureaucracy. 
 
With its exclusive control of overall government funding, the Executive Yuan has the ability to set 
an absolute limit on government activity. With relatively direct access to information from the 
bureaucracy, the executive has an advantage when it comes to providing policy proposals. 
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3.4 THE ROLE OF OPPOSITION IN THE POLICY PROCESS 
 
As we mentioned in the previous chapters, the ROC had been governed by the KMT under a single 
party system for a few decades before the shoots of democracy developed strongly enough to ensure 
other parties' emergence. The DPP, as an integration of the Dangwai (A concept on collected power 
outside a party) power was finally formed in 19861, although it was illegal at the beginning. The 
KMT or more specifically the president Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated its formulation and took no 
action, under the justification of "they respect the ROC constitution and eschew communism and 
Taiwan independence".2 The DPP became the main opponent power to the KMT ruled government. 
Furthermore, other interest groups or later formed parties also to a certain extent took actions, like 
expressing their political views and fighting their own rights against the ruling party. One example 
could be the Environmental groups, Kung Liao residents and the local government who battled with 
polices to show their opposition on nuclear construction. In the end, the Executive Yuan had to 
compromise and agree to budget the local development and environmental protection after the 
construction.3 The New Party’s (NP) foundation on 10 August 1993 was another example. The 
originators of the NP were basically from the KMT including some senior executives and legislators 
who showed their oppositions to the KMT’s policies in some areas, like direct presidential 
elections, human rights and etc. This split reduced the KMT’s seats from 96 to 90 in legislature and 
challenged the KMT’s electoral strategy, since the NP’s members were the KMT’s iron ballots.4 
However, we will look more into the DPP’s performances in elections and strategies as to put their 
agenda, since the DPP was the main power in opposition to the KMT. 
 
Based on the theory on opponent party we mentioned before, Robert A. Dahl presents six patterns 
of oppositions, one of which is competitiveness. According to him, the level of competitiveness can 
be measured by taking into account the concentration of opposition (number and nature of parties) 
and strict competitiveness on key votes in legislature. In multi-party system, no majority single-
party power can be formed unless one party can form a majority by itself. In the ROC case, it is 
particular since when the DPP was just formed, it was quite a young opposition, while the KMT had 
formed themselves as a majority many years ago. Thus, the DPP had to compete intensely with the 
                                                            
1 Democratic Progressive Party Official Website. Web. 29 May 2010 
2 Riggers, Shelley. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. Web. 29 May 2010. p.126 
3 Tan, Qingshan. "Democratization and Bureaucratic Restructuring in Taiwan."  Web. 25 May 2010. p.50 
4 Riggers, Shelley. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. Web. 29 May 2010. p.167 
43 
 
KMT while lacking sufficient experience, media access, support from the population and etc. The 
1986 National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections were a rushed but good start for the DPP to 
act in the ROC's political arena. It fought for the freedom of expression and fewer campaign 
restrictions which made a basis for the coming lifting of the martial law.1 
 
Lifting of the martial law 
Lifting of the martial law was one of the founding goals of the DPP, and also the compromise of the 
president Chiang Ching-kuo after the Dangwai politicians joined together and frequently tested the 
limits of tolerance of his regime. However, the ruling party still believed that Taiwan's security 
needed protection and a national security law was necessary in order to replace the martial law to a 
certain extent. Although the opposition fought to block it in the Legislative Yuan and in the streets, 
they could only delay it in the end. The new national security law was passed on 23 June 1987 and 
President Chiang Ching-kuo released lifting martial law on 15 July.2 It can be seen in the new 
national security law that ordinances like eschewing communism and insuring national security 
were still kept, while others like the ban on new party formulation and new newspaper license did 
not exist anymore.3 
 
The lifting of the martial law was a watershed achievement of the DPP-led opposition politicians. 
The remarkable significance led to a new stage of democratization, one of which was the 
legalization of new parties. Another key thing to the opposition was the allowance on new 
newspaper licenses.4 The DPP, from this start point, could have had a better condition to achieve its 
political goal and use competitive strategy. Elections were decisive in order for the DPP to compete 
with the KMT, thus, putting a great strain on the electoral campaigns. As we discussed on the 
strategy of oppositions which they exercise to obtain their goals, the DPP had to seek to gain 
enough votes in elections to win majority of seats in parliament and then to form a government 
consisting of its own leader. The ban lift on mass media doubtlessly provided the DPP more 
strategies to obtain their goals in the later elections. 
 
The 1992 Legislative Yuan election 
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The 1992 Legislative Yuan election was a success to the DPP even though its share in seats was still 
behind the KMT. On one hand it was because of the controversy and dissension within the ruling 
party,1 and on the other hand the DPP succeeded in utilizing the KMT's bad campaign and was 
benefited from its TV ads. The KMT Legislative Yuan candidates won the election while fell from 
96.66% in 1980 to 63.26% in 1992 with 96 seats. On the contrary, the DPP was able to set the 
political agenda and increased its vote share steadily from 22.17% in 1986 to about 31% in 1992 
with 50 seats.2 It was a significant success for a new party being formed for only 6 years in 
competing with a ruling party with decades of history. Despite the KMT's internal division and 
dissension, the DPP's campaign ads successfully won the support from voters: 
 
"In three 1992 DPP TV ads the wives of opposition politicians told heartrending stories of 
how their families had suffered political persecution under Martial Law. DPP advertising 
also appealed to anti Mainlander sentiment by playing the ethnic card. For instance, 
another series of 1992 DPP TV ads showed an actor impersonating Mainlander Premier 
Hao Bocun’s numerous verbal gaffes. One of these reminded voters that Hao had once 
said, 'I love Taiwan, I love the Mainland (China) even more.'"3 
 
In addition, the KMT at the time sank into the dilemma in "money politics". The rampant real-estate 
speculation drove up land prices. Finance Minister Wang Chien-hsuan suggested to tax excessive 
profits but was refused by President Lee Teng-hui. After that, Wang and the head of the 
Environmental Protection Agency Shao-kong joined the legislative contest which disarrayed the 
KMT's strategy.4 This, which could be considered as anti-KMT and other interest group powers, 
played as opponent roles to the ruling party and from another perspective helped the DPP to win 
more seats in Legislative Yuan. Moreover, many KMT candidates also worried that if they didn’t 
support direct presidential elections, they would lose the election. The KMT finally delayed the 
decision on it until 19955, but this unfortunately led to the emergence of the NP and the oppositions 
ultimately got the opportunity of the first direct presidential election in 1996.6 
 
The DPP in 1994 
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1994 is a significant year for the DPP. It would be seen as a prominent change in the DPP's 
competitive strategies which marked that the party had become maturer than before. In 1994 Taipei 
mayoral contest which was the first live televised debate, Chen Shuibian from the DPP sternly 
criticized the KMT mayor Huang Dazhou. Huang performed poorly which was not surprising; since 
he was a government appointed mayor and never stood for any elected offices. 1  The DPP's 
improvement was in their expansive strategies, like a new tactic in using TV ads. This debate way 
gave a fair platform for all candidates and was also money saving. The DPP's competitive strategies 
could be seen to be also pluralized if analyzing it by Robert A. Dahl's theory on the patterns of 
decisiveness – that elections were important but not decisive. 
 
Also the same year, the DPP pushed some pro-public policies to fulfill their promise in establishing 
a democratic and welfare-type of Taiwan. Examples of these policies could be the old-age pensions 
and the anti-nuclear movement. On 1 July, the DPP-governed municipals and counties (including 
Taipei, Yilan, Xinzhu, Tainan, Gaoxiong, Penghu) started to grant old-age pensions. On 12 July, 
Legislative Yuan re-examined the budget of constructing nuclear power; the DPP legislators and the 
local people expressed their intense oppositional position. In the late of this year on 3 December, 
Chen Shuibian from the DPP was elected to become the mayor of Taipei.2 
 
The cases of the DPP in 1994 were good examples and could be explained by Robert A. Dahl’s 
theory on the strategies of opposition, that the gaining public support and winning votes in elections 
are both important; although neither of them is sufficient enough or decisive, they are much more 
combined with each other closely. Besides their focus on national-level elections, the DPP 
concentrated on competitions in local level as well, by which the DPP earned more public support. 
In spite of the DPP's immature campaigns in some elections before or after, the opposition could be 
encouraged for running on the right track according to the achievements in 1994. 
 
Conclusion 
Around the time the DPP was just founded, they with Dangwai paraded and fought against the 
martial law in the early stage, while after a few years campaigned more smartly in coalition with 
other political power or local residents and using TV ads. Holding the DPP’s struggle in National 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections constant, their strategies had expanded from merely 
concentrating on national-level elections to a broader competition in local level as well, in order to 
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obtain reputation and public support. These indirect strategies to win national-level elections could 
benefit the DPP in a long term. Therefore, the DPP along with its political orientation could to a 
wider and more full-scale extent put their agenda in the political process while in opposition to the 
KMT. To conclude it in prospective, although the DPP’s candidates were defeated by Lee Teng-hui 
and Lien Chan from the KMT in 1996, the first direct presidential elections,1 it was just the first 
time for them. And in the later 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, Chen Shuibian from the DPP 
won2 which to a certain extent confirmed the DPP’s effort and strategy on their political process in 
opposition to the KMT. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
 
With the reforms, authority was dispersed among more people, members of the legislative Yuan and 
the local Politicians. With the reforms were established check and balances on the bureaucracy. 
This made the system cleaner and more transparent. This made it significantly less easy for 
government officials to rely on inertia to remain in office, and made corruption more difficult to 
conceal. These reforms also gave the Legislative Yuan more influence on the implementation, but 
the main change was to increase transparency. 
 
During the democratization, opposition germinated, gradually appeared and put pressure on over the 
ruling party regime. This pressure had become increasing intensive year by year, and because of it, 
changes were made.. In the year 1986, the collected opponents finally formed the Democratic 
Progressive Party regardless of the prohibition on new party’s foundation issued by the KMT 
government. However, with the end of the martial law the DPP was legalized not long after. The 
ROC shifted from single-party system to multi-party system, and from then on had stepped onto a 
new stage of democratization dramatically.  
 
The KMT enacted reforms of the relationship between the bureaucracy and elected officials, In 
order to regain popularity and allow KMT members to be re-elected. As a result, the bureaucracy 
lost its previous influence on policy decisions at both national and county levels, though it was still 
the primary source of policy implementation. Instead, the elected politicians and the public had 
gained greater say. The Legislative Yuan started to play an increasing important role in agenda 
setting and broad decisions on policies, which made this process more democratic than it was before 
in single-party system. However, since the Executive Yuan controlled the overall government 
funding, it could still to a big extent limit the Legislative Yuan’s functions and the government 
activities. The reforms of policy proposals made it easier for the DPP and other anti-KMT parties 
and interest groups to push their agenda in oppositions to the KMT along with the democratic 
process.   
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4.2 LIMITATIONS 
 
Time and available material are always the biggest factors and limits to any research. Our project 
was not different. We have started pretty early on and it seemed that there is a lot of empirical data 
we could use. But as we concentrated on the theories, data seemed to be less and less relevant 
resulting in a rather theoretical than empirical project. 
 
We have thoroughly concentrated on our theories and took a lot of time discussing and applying 
them, but with little previous discussion whether we have chosen the right theories (as in the right 
school of thought) it is hard now to assess the amplitude, i.e. how much does the project cover, of 
our project. Furthermore, all of our theories are based on studies in the Western democracies and as 
the ROC is a young East Asian democracy. As far as we know, there is little theoretical information 
on these newly emerged Asian democracies. Thus, we have done most we could have in this sense.  
 
Moreover, we had some problem with the data as information or rather view point of the Taiwanese 
or Chinese authors had a tendency to differ slightly from the information given in Western author 
books. Thus, even though we had factual data set, analyzing some aspects was hard while having to 
figure out, which perception is the most believable one.   
 
Finally, we have used data that mostly deals with broad trends. In a way it was helpful as it made it 
easier to apply theories and create framework, but we had too few examples. Thus, with little 
illustrations of our cases points we tried to make may be a bit vague.  
 
4.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In light of the changes made by the KMT, it could be interesting to examine to what extent these 
changes affected the implementation of the DPP during their control of the presidency 2000-2008. 
In accordance with our conclusion, we would expect the DPP to have greater difficulty with the 
implementation of policy than previous governments, since policy proposals are now open to public 
discussion. 
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Another angle could be to examine the prevalence of corruption under DPP rule. Our data suggests 
that corruption was relatively widespread under the KMT. The changes to bureaucratic procedures 
were intended to make the system more transparent, with the aim of decreasing corruption. Further 
research could then be devoted to examine whether these changes had the intended effects. 
 
The changes in the policy-making process were also intended to increase the influence of the public 
on policy. A third area of inquiry would be to examine how the public, particularly organized 
interests, attempted to influence policy. Followed by an analysis of the extent to which such 
attempts were successful. 
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